Traditional theories of capital structure imply a consistent relationship between firm profitability and firm leverage. Empirical data, however, suggest that the relationship is not monotonic. In the cross-section of firms, non-profitable firms become significantly more leveraged as losses decrease; profitable firms become significantly less leveraged as profits increase until a point where the most profitable firms have again significantly greater leverage as profits increase. In this paper, we present an extension of a model of Xu and Birge (2004) that is consistent with these observations. The model assumes that * This work was supported by the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. I would like to thank Nellie Zhao for assistance in compiling the data and, for helpful comments and suggestions, Doug Diamond, Milt Harris, Josh Rauh, Avri Ravid, Amir Sufi, and seminar participants at Case Western Reserve, the University of MassachusettsAmherst, Syracuse University, the University of Texas-Dallas, the INFORMS National Meeting, Washington, DC, 2008, and MSOM Meeting, MIT, 2009. 1 2 firms make debt and production scale decisions that depend on fixed costs necessary to maintain operations, variable costs of production, and volatility in future demand forecasts. In addition to predicting the convex relationship between profit margins and leverage that appears in the data, the model also predicts decreasing inventory volatility for non-profitable firms followed by increasing inventory volatility for profitable firms, which is also a statistically significant result in the data. These observations are consistent with a model of firms that make early price and quantity commitments in advance of demand realization as in the classical news vendor model of operations.
Introduction
The relationship between firm characteristics and capital structure decisions has been an active focus of academic research since Modigliani and Miller (1958) (MM) showed the irrelevance of capital structure in a perfect market. MM theory also justifies separation of operational and financial decision making in the perfect-market setting but says little about the conditions under market imperfections. While more recent work has considered various market imperfections and their potential impact on capital structure, the vast majority of these papers consider operational decisions as exogenous (or severely limited). This paper considers and tests the predictions of a model that incorporates operational decisions in which the firm's production scale decision precedes the realization of demand so that the firm actively determines both its operating and financial leverage simultaneously. Empirical results support the predictions of this model in terms of the relationships among profitability, capital structure, and the volatility of firm inventory.
Several major theories address market imperfections and capital structure. According to Modigliani and Miller's traditional trade-off model (1963) , firms exchange the tax advantages of debt with the costs of financial distress (such as deadweight costs in the event of bankruptcy). Jensen and Mackling (1976) articulates an agency cost interpretation involving conflicts between shareholders and managers and between debt-holders and equity-holders. Myers and Majluf's (1984) adds a pecking order theory based on information asymmetries between the firm and potential lenders. Other theories include those of corporate control, as in Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) , and of competition in product markets, as in Brander and Lewis (1986) and Tittman (1984) . Summaries appear in Ravid (1988) , Harris and Raviv (1991) , and Myers (2003) .
The predictions of these theories vary but, in terms of firm profitability, trade-off models gen-erally predict increasing leverage with increasing profitability (although Dotan and Ravid (1985) and Hennessy and Whited (2005) have conditions for the opposite prediction). Agency-cost models also often follow this prediction, while pecking-order models predict decreasing leverage with increasing profitability. A common characteristic is that these predictions are monotonic in profitability. A recent exception is the model in Alan and Gaur (2011) in which the relationship is non-monotonic. An earlier exception is in the relationship between long and short-term debt in the model in Diamond (1991) , in which both the lowest and highest credit-rated firms use short-term debt while those in between use long-term debt. Another model with potential dichotomous results appears in Hart and Moore (1998) , where the relationship between near and far-term uncertainty determines the difference between short and long-term debt choices. Interpreting very long-term debt as similar to equity would yield results similar to those that we predict here.
Among the relatively few papers that include operational characteristics, Dotan and Ravid (1985) consider a model in which production decisions are endogenous (but assume no price impact from the firm's production-scale decision). In this framework, they provide conditions under which leverage decreases with increases in profitability (expected prices). Other papers that consider operational and production decisions include Lederer and Singhal (1994) , whose model shows that simultaneous financing and technology choices produce greater value, but do not have an explicit prediction on a profitability relationship. Additional examples include Mauer and Triantis (1994) , whose model assumes instantaneous production and, while including market imperfections, predicts little link between financial and operational decisions. Among more recent papers, Hennessy and Whited (2005) provides a dynamic tradeoff model that includes capital investment and, as noted above, can lead to decreasing leverage in firm liquidity based on investors' preferences. Hu and Sobel (2007) and Dada and Hu (2008) also consider financing decisions in an operational context with different forms of market imperfections that prevent separation of financial and operational decisions, while Alan and Gaur (2011) considers a similar situation to that considered here with information asymmetry and credit limits governing the level of debt.
Empirical studies have generally shown that the standard trade-off model prediction of increasing leverage with increasing profitability does not agree with empirical results. Examples include Fama and French (2002) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) , which show a strong negative relationship using U.S. data. These results are so highly significant (up to 12.5 standard errors below zero in Fama and French (2002) ) that this trade-off theory prediction appears refuted. The studies have, however, generally been linear regressions that would only observe dominant first-order effects and would not capture significant effects that might occur in the tails of the distributions of the independent variables.
In this paper, we build on a trade-off model presented in Xu and Birge (2004) that captures both operational and financial leverage decisions. A key difference in this model from others is a prior commitment of production before the realization of uncertain demand. This feature effectively introduces an additional future revenue dependence on the production decision (not present, for example, in the Dotan and Ravid (1985) model) and a lag (not present, for example, in the Mauer and Triantis (1994) model). For firms without significant fixed costs, this model predicts a convex relationship, which may become U-shaped, between profitability and leverage. In this paper, we include a fixed cost component that extends these predictions to increasing leverage as unprofitable firms approach profitability. These predictions and an additional predication on the relationship between inventory volatility and profitability are supported empirically.
While these predictions are not explicit in terms of asset returns, they are consistent with an operating leverage interpretation of the value premium as in Novy-Marx (2011) . In that model, operating leverage and operational inflexibility are explanatory characteristics for the value premium in returns. An analogy of these characteristics to those here is that operating leverage may be considered roughly inversely proportional to operating margin. Operational flexibility should increase as fixed costs decline relative to variable costs, but should then increase as low leverage firms produce at high consistent levels while revenues follow market-driven demand processes. If this is the case, we should then expect that low-margin (high-leverage) firms are low in operational flexibility but that high-margin (low-leverage) firms are also low in operational flexibility. To the extent that high operating leverage and low operational flexibility are positively correlated with expected returns, we should then expect that low-margin/high-leverage firms have significant positive excess returns. We might also use the relationship we observe with inventory volatility as an additional measure of operational flexibility that might enable further clarification of the operating leverage hypothesis.
Inventory relationships with margins, excess returns, and costs of capital have also been investigated in a number of other studies. These studies have focused on absolute inventory levels, instead of volatility as here, but have generally consistent results. and Roumiantsev and Netessine (2007) observe positive correlation between inventory levels and gross margins. Chen, et al. (2005) observe negative excess returns among firms with high inventory levels, which, assuming the positive relationship between inventory levels and margins, is consistent with results on low operating leverage. Hendricks and Singhal (2005) also show that the impact of disruptions to inventory levels appears to have a significant impact on returns. The effect of capital markets on inventory levels appears in Kashyap, et al. (1994) , which shows significant effects on inventory investment during periods of tight monetary supply and which is also consistent with the model here. While these results all have more fundamental bases, Lai (2006) finds evidence of significant behavioral effects in inventory levels, particularly in terms of firms' catering to market reactions to inventory levels. Our model does not include such a behavioral motivation, but this effect might be interpreted as consistent with an extension of the model here to include managerial incentives as in Xu and Birge (2008) .
The next section presents the basic model and predictions. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 provides conclusions and extensions.
Basic Model and Predictions
We assume a firm with a current (at time t) sales capacity k t that is scaled as a limit on firm sales in the next operating period (for example, k t can be finished-goods inventory for a manufacturing firm). In this case, the firm can purchase additional sales capacity x t (by, for example, new production) at a constant marginal cost c t , leaving capacity for the next period at y t = k t + x t .
To remain in operation at time t, we also assume the firm must pay fixed costs K t (k t ) (that may depend on the remaining capacity or inventory k t but is independent of the t-period decision x t ) and re-pay previous debt D t−1 . The firm must finance all current costs with a combination of debt D t and equity E t (which is implicitly defined as a net dividend or subscription payment for continuing operations). In the basic model, prices p t are exogenously determined but prices could also be endogenous without altering the observations if prices require early commitment as well.
In this model, we assume that debt is repaid each period (without an intervening opportunity to re-negotiate), that the firm can choose to cease operations, leading to bankruptcy and a deadweight loss proportional (with proportionality constant 1 − α) to any net revenues, and that debt is fairly compensated at a rate r t so that, under a risk-neutral equivalent demand distribution, the expected return on D t is equal to a riskfree rate r f . Here, the firm is a competitive price-taker with sales equal to price p t times the minimum of capacity, k t + x t , and demand, s t with (riskneutral equivalent) density f t and cumulative F t . A constant corporate tax rate on profit in each period is τ . The value of the firm (as well as the underlying parameters in each period t) depends on a history process ω t with probabilities updated to include past observations of sales with the assumption that the value is concave and increasing in the sales observation. The model can then be given as:
where s e t is defined as the break-even point for taxable profits (p t s e t − c t x t − r t D t − K t = 0) and s b t is the maximum demand level s for which V t+1 (k t+1 (y t , s t ), D t , ω t+1 |(s t , ω t )) = 0 (i.e., the maximum sales level that would lead to default). The remaining production capability k t+1 (y t , s t ) can be interpreted in the manufacturing context as remaining inventory (i.e., k t+1 = y t − s t ).
Since debt in Model (1)-(2) has zero net present value (and new equity issues are costless as, for example, might be the case for a firm under a private equity arrangement), Model (1)-(2) assumes that net cash flow is returned to equity investors as (positive or negative) dividends in each period (i.e., debt terms in the objective result in zero net present values, leaving only equity cash flows).
The model then maximizes the total discounted value of all such dividends using a full-information setting to focus on the relationship between operational and financial choices.
As mentioned earlier, p t could also be a decision variable without changing the observations (although it would make the analysis more cumbersome). The critical aspects that make Model
(1)-(2) different from most other models of integrated investment and financing decisions are the early production commitment decision x t , which is uncommon in the finance literature, and the fair-valued-debt constraint in (2), which is uncommon in the operations literature. The earlycommitment of price and production is familiar in a manufacturing context, such as the automotive industry, where prices and production capacity are set in anticipation of model-year demand, but also applies to services, such as legal and consulting firms, which set rates and hire associates annually in anticipation of demand. In both cases, recourse actions, such as price cuts, customer rebates, and employee furloughs, can reduce the impact of insufficient demand, but much is committed in advance. For the key financial assumption, the debt constraint assumes a competitive financial market and that borrowers cannot credibly deceive lenders about market conditions (over the single period of each loan). The use of a risk-neutral or equivalent martingale measure also implicitly assumes the absence of arbitrage in financial markets (although the firm here may have some unique production capability which creates value).
In comparison to the other papers mentioned, the model in Dotan and Ravid (1985) includes both capacity commitment and fairly-priced debt, but production (up to capacity) is an ex post decision after observing a random price. The key difference from Model (1)- (2) is in the impact of the capacity decision on the volatility of future cash flows. In Model (1)- (2), low additions to capacity x t can severely restrict future cash flow volatility (which makes borrowing costs low) while low capacity in the Dotan and Ravid (1985) model still incurs full price volatility. The two models have some common implications and each may correspond to certain practical situations, but the volatility implications for inventory and the relationship between leverage and profitability of Model (1)- (2) as in the hypotheses below are different from those in Dotan and Ravid (1985) .
Other aspects that Model (1)- (2) does not capture include carry-back and carry-forward of taxes, differential investor tax treatments, financing (e.g., issuance) fees, long-term debt, multiple products and resources, and competitor and supply chain characteristics. While each of these elements is an important part of operational and financial decisions, the main focus of the model here is to develop an aggregate-level understanding of the impact of integrated decisions and to see whether the implications of that analysis are consistent with practice. For the most part, adding state variables, such as taxes carried forward and multiple-resource capacities, would only increase the model complexity without changing any fundamental model behavior. Long-term debt, investor tax considerations, and issuance fees would change the nature of the model, making agency costs and information asymmetries more relevant. We wish, however, first to see what implications result from the basic model before considering the additional potential impact of these issues.
Xu and Birge (2004) examined a two-period version of (1)- (2). Among the conclusions from that study, the basic model in (1)- (2) implies that firm value is more sensitive to mis-specification of the operational decisions x t than to mis-specification of the debt decisions D t . Xu and Birge (2004) provide numerical examples to justify this conclusion. While a full analytical justification is complicated by the nonlinear relationships among D t , r t , s ban interior optimum (i.e., x t > 0 and D t > 0) in (1), which can be written as:
where r t (D t ) is defined implicitly to satisfy the first constraint in (2) (so that the debt is fairly priced) with a corresponding default point
for a fixed horizon T as in the two-stage case). In the event of multiple solutions, the least solution is assumed.
To see the relative influence of x t and D t on the firm value V t , consider the relative change in V t from the inclusion of debt (with p t normalized to 1):
which, eliminating the default recovery term, α
where each term is negative except the first. In particular,
which, for s b t = D t (1 + r t ) as in the t = T case, becomes
The right-hand side of (10) can be evaluated to provide an upper bound on the value gain attainable from issuing debt. As an example, suppose f t (s) represents a log-normal density such that log(s) ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ), a normally distributed random variable with mean µ and variance σ 2 . In this case, the maximum firm value (in the last stage with p T = 1) is given by E s (s) = e µ+σ 2 /2 ≥ D t . In that case, with Φ denoting the standard normal cumulative, the right-hand side of (10) is given by
where the second inequality (12) uses that Φ(
, where V ar(s) is the variance of s, i.e., σ is the square root of the log of one plus the squared coefficient of variation of demand. For coefficients of variation below one (which is true for annual reported sales of 97% (3786 of 3892) of the firms reporting sales from 2001 to 2010 in the Compustat database analyzed in Section 3), σ < 0.83 = log(2) and 2Φ(σ/2) − 1 < 0.32, implying that the gain from issuing debt can be no greater than 32% of the debt offered. In the median case of 30% coefficient of variation in annual sales, the upper bound in (12) is 12% of D t . Additionally, this is reduced by the other terms in (7), which are roughly proportional to (1 − τ )r t D t . A median firm with τ = 0.35, r t = 6%, and D t = 0.4V t , might then only gain 3% in value V t from the choice of D t in this framework
This analysis considered the amount that could be gained from the tax advantage by issuing debt over not issuing debt. Losses might also arise from excessive debt. In this situation, the right-hand side of (10) (the first two terms on the right-hand side of (7)) is positive if
as would generally occur, and, in any case, is at least −r t D t . The second two terms in (7) satisfy:
and, thus, the worst-case loss in value from excessive debt is of the order 2r t D t or roughly the order of the interest rate r t if D t = 0.5V t . Overall, the magnitude of possible losses from mis-specified debt in this situation (with full information and terminal time horizon) then appears to be a low multiple of the interest rate.
The effect of mis-specification in the operational decision x t can be more severe. Indeed, allowing x t → 0 or x t → ∞ (for the log-normal case) reduces V t to zero. Less extreme mis-specification leads to lower losses in value but the entire range of value changes is possible in contrast to the effect from mis-specified debt. This observation on the relative effects of mis-specification arises partially from the model's full-information setting where the fair pricing of debt tempers the negative impact of excessive or insufficient borrowing. In the fully competitive and informed financial market, the net effect of financing decisions on firm (hence, equity) value is then second order compared to the direct impact from the production decision x t .
In addition to this observation that mis-specified operational decisions x t have a greater impact on firm value than mis-specified debt, D t . Xu and Birge (2004) also provides numerical illustration in the two-period version of Model (1)- (2) that the capital structure of the firm (market leverage measured as the ratio of debt to market value D t /V t ) has a convex relationship to firm margins as measured by p t − c t with initial a negative relationship between leverage and margins for low margins and eventually, may increase in operating margin for high margin values.
Intuitively, this result occurs because low-margin firms produce at a low quantile of the future demand distribution to prevent costly under-selling. Since these firms then face relatively little risk in their future earnings, they have low default probabilities and can support low-cost debt. For higher margins, firms increase their scale and increase risk (significantly relative to the low risk of the lowest margin firms). The result is the potential default probabilities rise rapidly as margins increase, causing higher borrowing costs, and decreasing leverage overall.
This relationship between profit margins and leverage is examined more fully in Xu and Birge (2008) , which explores the implications of managerial compensation incentives on production scale and capital leverage decisions. In general, the results show that compensation in the form of a bonus option on firm profits can lead to aggressive production decisions and conservative debt policy that may particularly decrease the value of low-margin firms relative to a first-best optimal policy, but that this form of compensation may have little adverse effect on managerial decisions for high-margin firms. The paper also shows that, with certain demand distributions, a U -shaped relationship may exist between market leverage and firm margins. That paper also presents empirical results that show a statistically highly significant decrease in leverage for low margins that increase from zero (i.e., for low but profitable firms) and a weakly significant increase in leverage for the highest margin firms. That empirical study (using Value Line data provided by Damodaran (2011)) did not, however, consider firms with losses (which would not exist in the steady state version of Model (1)- (2) with only variable costs and no growth opportunities).
Xu and Birge (2006) To provide some analytical justification for these observations, we consider the first-order
Note that x * t satisfying (3) is equivalent to:
which has the familiar form of the critical fractile. The result is that, when c t is high, so that the fractile is low, small relative reductions in c t lead to relatively large increases in x * t as the fractile
The addition of the fixed cost component in (1)-(1) over the previous model in Xu and Birge (2006) can be viewed as increasing the bankruptcy probability, and hence, the cost of debt, relative to a firm without such costs (since the firm must pay both the fixed cost and previous debt to remain in operation) and as decreasing the equity value. In both cases, as these fixed costs rise, leverage should decrease.
The presence of fixed costs makes direct observation of variable cost margins, as present in the Xu and Birge (2006) model, more difficult since observed operating margins in financial reports will include a combination of fixed and variables costs. Testable hypotheses can, however, still result from certain assumptions on the relationship between fixed costs and firms' variable profitability.
In order for firms with high negative operating margins (e.g., biotech firms which dominate much of this cohort of firms in the data) to attract investment, investors must expect some large potential reward. We might then expect that variable-cost operating margins for these firms are decreasing (or at least not increasing rapidly) as operating losses decrease to zero. The result should then be that the fixed cost effect, which leads to higher leverage for lower fixed costs, hence, lower operating losses, dominates for firms with operating losses and that firms with operating losses exhibit an increasing relationship between firm leverage and operating margins (i.e., with decreasing operating losses). We state this hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 1 Firms with operating losses exhibit an increasing relationship between debt-to-marketvalue ratio and pre-tax operating margin.
For firms with positive operating margins, we would expect that the variable cost component begins to dominate and fixed cost effects start to diminish. In this case, the observations of the variable-cost-only model should dominate as given in the next two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2 Firms with low positive operating margins exhibit a decreasing relationship between debt-to-market-value ratio and pre-tax operating margin.
Hypothesis 3 Firms with high positive operating margins may exhibit a increasing relationship between debt-to-market-value ratio and pre-tax operating margin, depending on the distribution of demand for the firm's products or services.
To test the assumption of decreasing fixed-cost dominance with initially declining and then rising variable-cost margins, we can also check on the variability of inventories (for firms with product inventories). If low variable-cost (high fixed-cost) firms dominate the lower end of the pre-tax operating margins and these firms make a consistent optimal decision on early production commitment, then their inventories should be more volatile than firms closer to positive operating margins which have higher variable but lower fixed costs. Correspondingly, high margin firms should have both low fixed and variable costs and should also have higher inventory volatility. The decreasing fixed-cost assumption and Model (1)-(2) are then consistent with high initial inventory volatility that should decline as firms reach profitability and then rise again for high-margin firms as in the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4
The volatility of inventories is initially decreasing in operating margin as firm losses decrease to zero and then increases as operating margin becomes significantly positive.
The next section describes tests to support these hypotheses.
Empirical Results
The results in this section consider both Value Line and Compustat data over the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . The Value Line data are from Damodaran (2011) . Differences between these two sources have been documented (e.g., Kern and Morris (1994) ), but overall results are quite similar. For measures of profitability, we use Pre-Tax Operating Margin from the Value Line data set (defined as EBIT divided by SALE for the Compustat data). Using the ratio of earnings to sales (as opposed to return on assets as in other studies) is used because the model prediction is in terms of operating profits relative to sales as opposed to assets. While the model above makes no direct prediction about how capital structure should be related to profitability as a fraction of asset value, the ratio of earnings to asset value pulls the profitability margin for firms with higher asset values closer to zero. The result of this shift increases the observed leverage ratio for firms near the decile including zero earnings and lowers the leverage of the low (negative) earning deciles as well as those of the high (positive) earning deciles. This observation is indeed reflected in the data (with leverage increasing until the first or second decile of positive earnings and then uniformly decreasing thereafter). This is the effect shown in Figure 1 , which plots the average market leverage in each decile of the average pre-tax operating margin (EBIT divided by SALE ) and return on total capital measured with both book equity (EBIT divided by short-term liabilities (DLC ) plus long-term liabilities (DLTT ) plus shareholder's equity (CEQ )) and market value of equity ( EBIT divided by DLC plus DLTT plus market capitalization given as common shares outstanding times price per share at fiscal-year end (CSHO*PRCC F )) for all Compustat firms reporting at least seven 1 of the years from 2001 to 2010. Note that division by book capital pulls high-leverage firms strongly toward the zero average earnings point, which occurs in the 4th decile in this dataset.
The steep decrease in leverage for higher returns on total capital is also consistent with the strong 1 Using all firm reports or reports in single years produces similar results. A minimum seven-year history is used here to remove potentially anomalous results from firms with short lifetimes. The EBIT/SALE results also appear in Table 4 . Since the hypotheses do not predict monotonic relationships between profitability and leverage, this study looks at deciles of profitability in terms of pre-tax operating margin and searches for significant differences between the mean levels of leverage and inventory volatility between adjoining deciles. Using this approach, Hypothesis 1 then predicts significant increases for the lowest deciles (up to the point of profitability). Hypothesis 2 then predicts significant decreases for deciles that start at levels of profitability, and Hypothesis 3 predicts only the possibility of increases at the highest deciles of profitability. Hypothesis 4 predicts significant decreases in inventory volatility for the lowest deciles followed by significant increases in inventory volatility for the highest deciles.
Support for Hypotheses 1 to 3 appears in Tables 1-3 As noted earlier, these results are also consistent with those using the Compustat data. As an indication of this consistency, Table 4 presents the results (also shown in Figure 1 ) for firms reporting seven or more years from 2001 to 2010 in Compustat, where the deciles are the average profitability for these firms over that period and the "average leverage" is the average of the annual market leverages for these firms over those years. These data again exhibit significant increases up to the fourth profitability decile followed by significant decreases in market leverage and then significant increases in two of the top three decile differences.
While these data consider all firms, the data do not reveal whether the differences in market leverage are consistent within industries or whether inter-industry relationships might better explain the results. Table 5 shows the composition of the firms by first-digit SIC code in the full Compustat set from 2001 to 2010 for the firms represented in Table 4 . As this table suggests, SIC 6 (Financials)
dominate the higher deciles of profitability and may partly explain the high significance of increases in leverage for these deciles. Decile 8, however, still has significantly higher leverage than Decile 7
in Table 4 without a dominating presence of financial firms.
To test these hypotheses within industry, Tables 6 and 7 Figure 4 plots the results for SIC's 1-to 5-while Figure 5 plots the results for SIC's 6-to 9-. Within industry, each group except SIC 5 (Wholesale and retail trade, which had only 13% of firms reporting losses in this period and, hence, little opportunity to observe the Hypothesis 1 prediction) and SIC 8 (Health, legal, and professional services, which has highly skewed leverage ratios such that the median market leverage is only 4% for the first decile while the mean leverage is 19% as given in Table 6 ) includes some significant increase in market leverage among the lower deciles (although not always significant between the first two deciles and only after decreases between the first two deciles for SIC's 2 (Chemical, food, and agriculturerelated manufacturing) and 7 (Hospitality, personal, household, and entertainment services). In each case, a significant decrease in market leverage occurs after the lower decile increase (although this is only significant across two decile differences from Decile 3 to 5 for SIC 4 (Transportation, communications, and utilities)). In SIC's 5, 6, 8, and 9 (which only includes Group 99, unclassified), a significant increase occurs between the 9th and 10th deciles (and also between the 7th and 8th deciles for SIC 6). Overall, the results provide support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 within industry groups, and for Hypothesis 3, since that only predicts that increases may occur at high profitability levels).
To distinguish whether these results are consistent with the model predictions that lower-decile firms in pre-tax operating margin are more dominated by fixed costs (and, hence, have lower relative variable costs than firms closer to profitability), Table 8 and Figure 6 show inventory volatility, measured as the average coefficient of variation of inventories as a fraction of sales for firms reporting positive inventories that were at least 1% 2 of sales over the period from 2001 to 2010, for each average pre-tax operating margin decile over this period. These data include highly significant decreases in inventory coefficient of variation for early deciles followed by significant increases in inventory volatility at higher deciles. The results support Hypothesis 4 and are consistent with shifting mixes of fixed to variable costs causing firms first to lower and then to raise operating risks, resulting in the U-shaped function for inventory volatility as a function of profitability. These results support the view (also considered by Roumiantsev and Netessine (2007) ) that firm practice is consistent with the news vendor operational model of early commitment to production and price before the realization of demand. Test statistics are for differences in means between the previous and current decile with one-sided significance indicated by * * * * for the 0.1% level, * * * for the 1% level, * * for the 5% level, and * for the 10% level.
Decile Test statistics are for differences in means between the previous and current decile with one-sided significance indicated by * * * * for the 0.1% level, * * * for the 1% level, * * for the 5% level, and * for the 10% level. 
Conclusions and Extensions
The hypotheses for the relationships between profitability and market leverage and between profitability and inventory volatility appear supported by data of U.S. firms over the past decade.
For the market overall and for industry groups, leverage first increases in profitability and then decreases for firms at low levels of profitability. Firms at higher levels of profitability then again have higher leverage, but much of this difference is explained by industry group. The results are consistent with un-profitable firms being dominated by fixed costs or operating leverage but having relatively large margins in terms of variable costs, which then results in these firms' having high inventory volatility. Inventory volatility then reduces for firms at low levels of profitability and increases again at the highest levels of profitability.
These observations suggest that firms' financial and operational decisions are linked through the leveraging effect of fixed costs and the amount of risk taken in production commitments, which in turn reflect firms' relative competitiveness in variable margins. The nonlinear form of the relationships among profitability, leverage, and inventory volatility also illustrates that even strong aggregate linear relationships discovered in regression studies may mask effects of opposite sign at certain ranges of the variables. The model given here does not consider various other factors such as competitive reactions, control, information asymmetries, and agency issues that appear in other models. Extensions to include such characteristics might modify the predictions or produce other explanations for the observed results. In particular, exploring the effects of varying debt structure and maturity may help explain the relative impact of different influences on debt policy.
For example, Hackbarth, Hennessy, and Leland (2007) provides a model (extended in Hackbarth and Mauer (2011) with investment decisions) that focuses on the role of priority and interactions among debt, capital structure, and investment. Empirically, Rauh and Sufi (2010) demonstrates the critical role of debt structure in the consideration of capital structure, supporting the importance of the monitoring role in debt relationships as in the model of Park (2000) .
The effect of debt structure on operational choices is another topic for potential future exploration. From a supply-chain perspective, the inter-relationships of debt, capital structure, production, investment, and trade credit present multiple topics for investigation, some of which are explored in Yang and Birge (2011a) , which focuses on the coordinating role that trade credit plays relative to other forms of debt, and Yang and Birge (2011b) , which considers the role of priority between trade and bank creditors in supply chain efficiency.
The observations in this paper also do not examine the extent to which suboptimal debt and production decisions detract from firm performance. As discussed in Section 2, the model suggests that mis-specified operational levels may have a greater impact on value than mistaken debt choices, but the results, while supporting the overall model structure, do not directly address the question of relative impact. A more detailed investigation of industry and firm characteristics may be able to illuminate more directly the relative role that operational and financial choices play in firm performance.
In addition to these issues, the model in this paper does not directly predict asset return behavior, which is another possible direction for extension. For example, if demand is highly correlated with a market return (as suggested in Gaur and Seshadri (2005) ), then firms with low operating margins (and higher default frequency) would have relatively higher expected future values under the natural demand probability measure than firms with high operating margins (and low default probability). We would then expect these firms to have higher expected excess returns, as in the operating leverage hypothesis that is supported by the data in Novy-Marx (2011).
Overall, further analysis of financial and operational interactions along these lines can provide greater understanding of the role that these functions play in the firm and how observations of firm activity can provide indications of potential performance.
